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North Korea is commonly portrayed in the West as the most opaque society that cannot be 
penetrated, much less understood by outsiders.  This paper traces the origins of North 
Korea’s opaqueness to the early days of the Cold War and argues that it has resulted as much 
from an intended blindness in the perceptions of American society toward North Korea as 
from North Korea itself.  During the Korean War, North Korean society was studied through 
the conceptual framework that reflected the emergent Cold War in the U.S.  As the American 
Army intensified its psychological warfare against the North Koreans, its representations of 
them were shaped by Cold War ideology. This paper concludes that the emergence of ‘North 
Korea’ as a Soviet puppet in American representations of the period laid the basis for 
America’s perceptions of North Korea and its ‘intended blindness’ in the later period. 
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Introduction 
 
“OUR NATION HONORS HER SONS AND DAUGHTERS WHO ANSWERED THE CALL 
TO DEFEND A COUNTRY THEY NEVER KNEW AND A PEOPLE THEY NEVER MET.” 
 
In one corner of Washington D.C. Mall, across from the Vietnam War Memorial, 
stand statues and monuments that commemorate the Korean War.  Engraved on the floor on 
the heart of this memorial, is the above tribute.  Despite the nobility of the sentiment it 
expresses, a question lingers: did America’s sons and daughters really fight to defend a 
country they never knew and a people they never met?  If, by “knowledge,” one refers to 
what is engendered in a moment of physical contact or face-to-face encounter, it is probably 
true that American soldiers came to “know” Koreans for the first time on the battlefields of 
Korea.  And yet, it must also be true that images of the enemy were already well defined in 
their minds even before they experienced these frontline encounters.  What were these 
images and how did they come to be? 
  
The enemy of the United States has historically taken the form of an “ism”: 
communism during the Cold War and terrorism more recently.  Considered a “puppet 
regime” of the Soviet Union before the latter’s dissolution and now a “rogue state” that along 
with Iraq and Iran make up the terrorist threat, North Korea has been twice crowned the 
enemy by the United States.  In real life, of course, America’s enemy may be specific nations, 
terrorist organizations, or drug cartels, but the image of this enemy has proven quite 
susceptible to change, depending on shifts in American national interest (or interpretations of 
that interest).  There are neither permanent friends nor permanent foes in the international 
arena, as the saying goes, and it is precisely the task of those who specialize in international 
politics or diplomatic history to map these changes motivated by national interests.  Beyond 
this realm, however, there is another dimension to international relations that one might term 
epistemological.  How is the other defined and apprehended at the national level?  What are 
the interpretive methods involved in turning this other into an object of knowledge?  Such 
analysis can get at the heart of relationship between different nations in unique and valuable 
ways. 
  
The U.S. first began to take an interest in Korea in the late nineteenth century during 
what is called the “port opening” period.  Throughout this period and the next—thirty-six 
years of colonial rule by the Japanese—American society saw Korea mainly through the eyes 
of missionaries, entrepreneurs, physicians and occasional travelers.  These encounters were 
sporadic at best, but the end of WWII opened a new chapter in Korea-U.S. relations as 
American military began its occupation of Korean territory south of the thirty-eighth parallel.  
The ensuing history of the relationship between the two countries has been complex; this 
study focuses on one particularly troubled aspect of that history.  In the following pages, we 
will examine the crystallization of America’s strategic interest vis-à-vis North Korea in the 
period between the end of WWII when the two countries came into full contact with each 
other and the division of the Korean peninsula into north and south following the Korean 
War, and analyze the process by which the American position came to take on a consistent 
framework that might be called “the perspective on North Korea.”  
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 In a sense, American academics have contributed greatly to creating enduring images 
of North Korea.  In existing studies on the early years of the regime, North Korea emerges as 
a totalitarian society and a satellite state of the USSR.  Its leaders are depicted as Soviet 
puppets, and its political history delineated as a succession of purges.  Works on North Korea 
published in 1950-1970’s are representative in this regard.  Their viewpoints, largely 
inherited in subsequent studies as well, laid the foundation for epistemological approach to 
North Korea in American academia.1  Noteworthy, however, is the fact that there have been 
almost no studies to date either in Korea or in the States which seek to shed light on the 
nature and formation of such an epistemology.  A countless number of studies have rehearsed 
the claim that North Korea is a totalitarian society or that it was a mere puppet of the USSR, 
but they have neglected to examine the process by which such a perception was produced 
and consolidated into an image in the first place.  Thus, one might charge that deductive 
reasoning rather than inductive analysis has been the operative methodology here.2 
  
On the whole, the image and characterization of North Korea that are widespread in 
American society occlude the historically constructed nature of their origins.  To subject this 
construction, then, to analysis is the main objective of this study.  By focusing on the 
activities and perspectives of individuals who played a crucial part in shaping early American 
policy on North Korea, we will trace the process through which certain images of North 
Korea came to be fixed in the American mind and ask what the nature of these images were.3            
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1  Regarding the U.S. scholars' studies of North Korean politics and the methodology in such studies, the 
preface and 1st chapter of Young-Chul Chung, “’Suryongje’ Political System as a Collective Development 
Strategy,” which will be presented in this workshop, could be consulted. 
2  Among the South Korean scholars studying the North Korean society, a new trend of criticizing the American 
scholars' and some of the South Korean scholars' attitude of 'painting' the North Korea with a pre-fixed image, a 
trend which showed new efforts to study the identity, its reason of existence and its own inherent development 
process of the North Korean society, has been forming since the 1980s. This sort of approach has been referred 
to by the South Korean scholars as an 'Immanent approach', and currently is widely accepted by the South 
Korean scholars' society as a viable method of research in North Korean studies, although there are still some 
differences in opinion as well. Through discussions to debate acceptable research methodologies in cases of 
dealing with North Korean social issues, South Korean scholars like Lee Jong Seok and Yu Gil Jae came to 
agree with the fact that understanding of the historical origin of the North Korean society, the inner strengths of 
North Korea, and the internal needs of the North Korean society should be obtained first, in order to properly 
analyze the North Korean society. 
3  Although it is not directly referring to the American scholars' perception of North Korea, Bruce Cumings 
sharply pointed out the nature of the American society's perception of Korea, with the expression of  ‘structured 
absence’(Bruce Cumings, “Bringing Korea Back In: Structured Absence, Glaring Presence, and Invisibility,” 
Warren I. Cohen ed., Pacific Passage: East Asian Relations on the Eve of the Twenty-first Century (Columbia 
University Press, 1996). In the meantime, Charles K. Armstrong examined the cultural aspects of the cold war 
which had been continuing both in the South and North parts of the Korean peninsula since right after the end of 
World War II. This study provides us with a lot of insights regarding the cold war mentality, and also the 
culture of the U.S. and South Korean societies, in the early days of the cold war(Charles K. Armstrong, “The 
Cultural Cold War in Korea, 1945-1950,”The Journal of Asian Studies Vol. 62, No. 1 (February 2003). 
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1. Korean Communists as Puppet of Kremlin 
 
1) American Perceptions of Korea Before Liberation  
A systematic perception of Korea began to emerge in American society during WWII.  The 
central role in the formation of this perception was played by the American military and 
government, since strategic intelligence on Korea which began to be collected systematically 
during the Pacific War became the most important source of information in producing  
knowledge of Korea.  As part of the war against Japan as well as postwar planning, various 
government offices, military agencies and information bureaus, including the State 
Department, Office of War Information (OWI), Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Military 
Intelligence Services of the Department of War, and the FBI collected intelligence on Korea 
and Korean communities overseas.  
 
If these intelligence offices, state bureaus and military agencies provided the data and 
analysis necessary for creating the image of Korean society, think tanks and policy makers 
who participated in America’s postwar planning were central in determining the tone that 
these perceptions would take.  For instance, members of the Advisory Committee on Postwar 
Foreign Policy and the “War and Peace” Project of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) 
discussed such issues as Korea’s strategic value in the postwar world order, Koreans’ self-
governing ability, the roadmap to Korean independence, the nature of the interim 
administrative organ in the transitional period between occupation and independence, and 
Korea’s economic situation and potentials.  They then drafted an outline of policies on 
postwar Korea, which served as the basis of the position the U.S. maintained throughout the 
Allies’ talks on postwar reconstruction.4     
  
Since a detailed examination of what these committees discussed regarding policy 
issues in postwar Korea lies beyond the purview of this essay, I will present here only a brief 
summary of their conclusions.  Broadly speaking, the CFR’s and the State Department’s 
postwar planning converged on the trusteeship plan for Korea.  The plan was based on two 
general premises.  The first concerned the geopolitical significance of the Korean peninsula.  
As the point where continental and maritime powers in Asia meet, Korea was seen as the 
ground where the interests of powerful nations like China, Japan and Russia collide head on.  
Since the monopoly of Korea by one of these nations would result in sharp hostilities, 
trusteeship over Korea shared by the interested nations was seen as necessary step until 
Korea became fully autonomous.  The U.S., of course, was to act in the capacity of overseer 
during the period of trusteeship to ensure that the interests of the major powers remain 
balanced.  The other premise was that Koreans would be unable to govern themselves.  Even 
though Koreans had been actively resisting the Japanese colonial government for decades, 
they were deemed to be incapable of establishing and administering an independent nation on 
their own. 
                                                 
4  Chung Yong Wook, The United States Policies toward Korea in 1940s, (Seoul; Seoul National University 
Press, 2003) Chapter 1. Regarding the activities of the Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy, 
documents of  National Archives II, RG 59 Records of Harley A. Notter, 1939-45, Records of the Advisory 
Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy could be consulted. Harley A. Notter served as the secretary of the 
committee, and was well aware of the objectives and goals of the committee. At the request of the State 
department, he authored a book documenting the activities of the committee, after the war. Harley A. Notter, 
Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation 1939-1945 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1950). 
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Once the policy position America would adopt and the principles of American 
involvement in Korea were hammered out, these became the basis for interpreting all 
available information on Korea.  American military and government made a particularly 
strong effort to assess the level of influence held by various political groups both in and 
outside of Korea, as well as these groups’ leanings.  They also paid close attention to these 
groups’ relationships with different nations neighboring Korea.  The general conclusion 
reached was that no single group possessed the administrative capacity to run an independent 
national government.  What is of greater interest, however, is the manner in which each 
political group was evaluated.  American postwar planners divided the Korean political field 
into five broad categories: Koreans in America, the Provisional Government in Chungking, 
anti-Japanese militants in Manchuria and Siberia, nationalists within Korea, and middle 
managers who participated in various organs of the Japanese colonial authorities.  A joint 
report by the British and Americans on Korean revolutionary element found that of these five 
groups, armed independence fighters in Manchuria led by Kim Il Sung and Ch’oe Hyŏn was 
one of the most active.  The report also assessed this group’s administrative capabilities as 
considerable. Another report predicted that the American military government would have to 
employ Korean bureaucrats who had served in the Japanese colonial government in order to 
carry out the occupation.  
  
Three observations can be made regarding the aforementioned postwar planning and 
strategic intelligences about Korea, in connection with American perceptions of North Korea 
in the post-liberation period.  First is that in its strategic thinking about Korea before Korea’s 
liberation from the Japanese colonial rule, the U.S. treated Korea as a single entity, even 
though Japan’s unexpectedly quick surrender would later lead the U.S. to occupy only the 
southern half of the Korean peninsula.  Secondly, the U.S. assessed various Korean political 
forces on the basis of each group’s self-governing capacity, leadership, and level of intimacy 
with different superpowers including the U.S.  Predictably, then, Syngman Rhee and Koreans 
in America were classified as pro-American, the Provisional Government in Chungking was 
seen as pro-Chinese, collaborators within Korea as pro-Japanese, and guerilla forces in 
Manchuria and Siberia as pro-Soviet.  These differences, however, were considered mostly 
factional in nature; at this time, at least, the U.S. did not have a clear position on which group 
to support.  Thirdly, the difference between North and South Korea is presented as a local 
characteristic in “JANIS 75: Korea,” a joint publication of the U.S Army and Navy which 
contains all strategic intelligence collected during the Pacific War. South Koreans, for 
example, were considered to be more phlegmatic and docile than the more ambitious and 
daring northerners.5 Comparing these perceptions to those that came to predominate in the 
                                                 
5  NA II, RG 407 Administrative Services Division, Operations Branch, Foreign(Occupied) Area Reports 
1945∼1954, Box 2101, “Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies 75: Korea,” p. X-7. The U.S. military issued a 
comprehensive report entitled “JANIS 75” in April 1945, which was a summation of intelligence reports 
regarding the Korean situation that have been collected for years. During World War II, in a joint effort the 
intelligence divisions of both the U.S. Army and Navy created a manual which included strategic information of 
many countries and would also ultimately prove useful in battlefield conditions. “JANIS 75” was one of them, 
and the number ‘75’ was an identification code  for the Korea. The contents of this report was so inclusive and 
filled with details of Korean politics, economy, society and cultural issues, that the OSS operatives in charge of 
Korean issues examined it and concluded that the contents “could replace all the Korean-related documents 
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period following the liberation, we can thus see that the division of Korea across the thirty-
eighth parallel was anything but natural.   The division was less an organic outgrowth of 
territorially expressed structures of difference within Korea than the result of politics of 
power on the global stage.   
 
2) American Military Government’s Pursuit of Containment and the Image of 
Korean Communists 
Following Japan’s surrender in 1945, the U.S. wished to occupy the entire Korea, but 
when the Soviet forces made their way down the Korean peninsula with alarming speed, the 
U.S. hurriedly decided upon the thirty-eighth parallel as the line of demarcation between 
American and Soviet occupation.   The U.S. troops finally arrived in Korea on September 8, 
1945 through the port of Inch’ŏn.  The occupation force in charge of South Korea was the 
24th Corps of the U.S. Army stationed in Okinawa, and the commanding general was the then 
Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge.  Hodge, who has since been called a “precocious Cold War 
warrior,” was a staunch anti-communist who believed that the goal of U.S. occupation was to 
turn South Korea into “a bulwark against the Soviet Union.”  Throughout the period of his 
command, Hodge did not swerve from the policy of preserving the status quo and 
suppressing revolution.  In the process, the project of decolonization was largely ignored.  
The challenge facing any nation freshly liberated from years of colonial rule is the 
eradication of colonial vices and legacy; what the majority of Koreans saw as the most urgent 
tasks in post-liberation Korea were bringing pro-Japanese collaborators to justice and 
accomplishing sweeping land reform.  Hodge, however, turned a deaf ear to repeated Korean 
demands to bring pro-Japanese collaborators to justice.  Not only did he not listen to these 
demands, he employed pro-Japanese collaborators in key positions of the American military 
government.  Moreover, the land reform which so many Koreans ardently desired was never 
implemented during the occupation.  Hodge’s position on American occupation of South 
Korea is encapsulated in such comments as “Koreans who worked for the Japanese can work 
for Americans,” and “I know that revolution is under way in South Korea.  But it cannot be 
carried out in a manner that threatens American interests.”6  Koreans’ deep dissatisfaction 
with American military occupation erupted in the “October Uprising,” but Hodge pinned this 
widespread opposition to the American rule entirely on propagandistic activities of 
communists and the Soviet Union rather than propose policy change to bring the U.S. 
occupation closer in line with what the majority of Korean people wanted.7     
  
The U.S. military defended its occupation policy as a stopgap measure to preserve the 
status quo, but the policy’s impact on Korean society was profound.  The course of action the 
U.S. pursued in Korea aimed on the whole at persecuting the left and supporting the right, 
where the “right” represented a congeries of pro-Japanese, ultra-reactionary, and pro-
                                                                                                                                           
created or issued before April 1945.” (“P.G. 108/1, Implementation Study for the Over-all and Special 
Programs for Strategic Services Activities Based in China, Korea, 15 May, 1945,” p. 20) 
6  NA II, RG 59 Records of the Wedemeyer Mission to China, Box 2 Folder ‘Korea’,  “Verbatim Transcript of 
Gen. Hodge’s Discussion with Wedemeyer Mission” 
7  The U.S. Military government in Korea officially propagated that the blame for the outbreak of the “Octobers 
Uprising” should be placed upon communists of both North and South Korea, but internal reports indicated that 
the main reason for such breakout was the arbitrariness and act of barbarism of the police (which was the 
stronghold of pro-Japanese collaborators) and the public’s objection to the economic policies of the U.S. 
military government, for example policy of collecting rice. 
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American elements in Korean society, rather than conservatives in the conventional sense of 
the word.  The boundaries of the “left” as understood by the U.S. military shifted constantly 
according to specific exigencies, and later came to encompass even moderates and the 
conservative right.  Lyuh Woon Hyung and Kim Kyu Sik, two leaders of the united left-right 
coalition committee whom Hodge supported at one time, were sometimes called democrats 
and sometimes communists by Hodge, despite the general consensus in Korean politics at the 
time that Lyuh Woon Hyung was a moderate left and Kim Kyu Sik a moderate right.  
Hodge’s opinion took such wild turns not because these men’s political tendencies underwent 
change over time but because their political utility to the U.S. was assessed differently at 
different times.  Following the outbreak of the Korean War, Hodge labeled Kim Kyu Sik and 
even the rightist politician Won Sei Hoon as communists.8  By calling most reformists 
communists and expelling them from the public arena of politics in this way, the U.S. 
occupation government succeeded in restructuring the South Korean political field around 
the extreme reactionary element.  
  
To be sure, it was the U.S.-U.S.S.R. occupation and partitioning of Korea that set the 
stage for the eventual political division of Korean society.  Still, it must be noted that the way 
in which the U.S. military government carried out the occupation expedited the process 
considerably and provided the classificatory scheme that reified political categories.  If we 
examine the left-right opposition in Korean society from a historical perspective, the attempt 
to locate the reason for Korean division in the struggle between leftist Koreans and rightist 
Koreans during this period cannot help but strike us as absurd.  Dividing political groups into 
left and right is simply a way of evaluating the political tendencies or radicalism of the 
groups in question, and is, therefore, inherently relative.  From the position of the extreme 
right, even the moderate right is leftist.  At a certain point in the post-liberation period, 
however, the terms left and right came to take on specific ideological content and fixed 
images.  In short, from this point onward, the left came to represent communism while the 
right was equated with nationalism or democracy.  
  
To see how foreign such formulations are in the Korean historical context, we need 
only go back to the colonial period when the distinction between the left and the right was a 
notion that separated the hardliners from those who espoused compromise in the 
independence movement. In 1927, for example, socialists and nationalists came together to 
fight Japanese imperialism by creating a united national liberation front called Shinganhoe.  
Throughout the colonial period, revolutionary forces in Korea sought to create a coalition 
between the left and right, seeing this as the most important goal whether tactically or 
strategically.  Moreover, politicians who returned to Korea upon liberation all espoused the 
slogan of “unification and solidarity,” a slogan which reflected both their concrete 
experiences during the colonial period and the demand for unity by the Korean people at 
large.  In short, the left-right distinction during the colonial period was not an opposition 
between irreconcilable ideologies but a question of which route to take or which means to 
adopt in the struggle for independence from Japanese imperialism.  Even the manuscript 
written by U.S. Army, “History of U.S. Armed Forces in Korea,” noted that the distinction 
                                                 
8  Letter for Preston M. Goodfellow, by John R. Hodge, 1950. 9. 19. Kim Kyu Sik and Won Sei Hoon were all 
kidnapped to North Korea after the Korean War broke out, and Hodge considered every person who 
communicated with North Korea as communists. 
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between the left (socialists) and right (nationalists), which came into being after the March 
First Movement with socialists taking on the leadership of the independence movement, 
signified little more than individual differences between the leaders.  It observed wittily that 
even the nationalist had rightist stomach but leftist mouth.9  
  
It was over the trusteeship issue that came to a head in late 1945 and early 1946 that 
the left-right tension took on the character of a bitter feud.  The trusteeship controversy 
served as the occasion for consolidating a pair of political formulas: the right was seen as 
anti-trusteeship, anti-Soviet Union, nationalist, and patriotic, and the left in contrast became 
aligned with pro-trusteeship, pro-Soviet Union, communist, and unpatriotic.  What triggered 
the anti-trusteeship campaign in South Korea was an article published in Donga Daily News 
and Chosŏn Daily News on December 27, 1945.  The article, which identified the Soviet 
Union, and not the U.S., as the proponent of trusteeship, was largely false.  It failed to 
mention the gist of the decision reached at the tripartite Foreign Ministers Conference at 
Moscow regarding “the establishment of a provisional democratic government in Korea, 
agreed upon by the joint U.S.S.R.-U.S. committee, as well as political parties and social 
organizations in both North and South Korea,” and focused narrowly on the issue of 
trusteeship.  A day before the text of the Moscow Agreement was released, the article was 
already in print in Seoul.  U.S. intelligence brief called “Political Trends” identified the 
source of this article as Pacific Stars and Stripes, a newspaper for overseas U.S. servicemen 
which was published by the MacArthur headquarters in Tokyo.10     
  
The article in Pacific Stars and Stripes which served as the source for Donga Daily 
News and Chosŏn Daily News false report came from the United Press in Washington, D.C., 
and was written by a reporter named Ralph Heinzen.  I have tried for years, without success, 
to locate this article in the archives of UPI which inherited the UP.  Though no major paper, 
neither The New York Times nor The Washington Post, picked up on this story, a similar 
article made its way onto the pages of Washington Times Herald.  The Herald, as is well 
known, later became the flagship paper of McCarthyists, serving as the mouthpiece of 
McCarthyism in its heyday.   Moreover, Ralph Heinzen’s reputation as a journalist was none 
too honorable.  A correspondent for UP who was active in Europe from the 1930s on, 
Heinzen was a European expert with next to no knowledge about Asia.  Among his 
colleagues, Heinzen had the reputation of being a notorious faker who was “known to do 
some writing off the wall using his imagination.”11 
  
To sum up, then, we can say that a left-right split in Korean society became a full-
scale conflict over the trusteeship imbroglio, which in turn was sparked off by the report in 
Donga Daily News and Chosŏn Daily News about the decision of the Moscow conference.  
This report, however, was highly specious.  Suspicions cloud its source, its writer and the 
                                                 
9  “History of U.S. Armed Forces in Korea,” ‘Part II. Korean Politics: The First Year, Chapter II’, pp. 7-8. The 
military historian who wrote this section was Richard D. Robinson. 
10  “Political Trends,” No. 15, 1946. 1. 5 (Appendix, G-2 Periodic Report of 24th Corps) 
11  H. L. Stevenson's record of interviewing Wallace Carroll, 1992( http://www.auburn.edu/~lowrygr/ 
history1.html). Stevenson served as the former vice president and chief editor of UPI. UPI was the successor of 
UP. Wallace Carroll had served as a special correspondent since before World War II and throughout the war, 
in London, Paris, Geneva, Madrid and Moscow. He later moved to work at the U.S. government’s Office of 
War Information, and later moved to New York Times. 
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path by which its information was transmitted.  Of greater interest, however, is the way both 
the anti-trusteeship movement and the leftist support of the Moscow decision were 
understood and represented by the U.S. military government.  The American perspective and 
rhetoric on this issue are deeply revealing.      
  
In the first days of the occupation, the yardstick the U.S. military government used to 
characterize political groups in Korea was not whether they were communist or nationalist, 
but whether they were radical or conservative.  Reports submitted to the superiors in the 
immediate post-liberation period all describe the political field in South Korea in terms of the 
struggle between radicals and conservatives.  George Z. Williams, who played a central role 
in his capacity as the adviser to General Hodge, the head of the U.S. military government in 
Korea, in bringing pro-Japanese elements and Korean Democratic Party personnel into the 
military government, went one step further and described this conflict as one between 
radicals and democrats.12  To Williams, conservatives were those who complied with the U.S. 
military government, which was also the reason why they could be considered democratic.  
According to one military historian in the occupation headquarters, this was a routinely used 
method in the military government of classifying political groups.13  Several factors 
accounted for the fact that the U.S. applied these categories.  First, Americans could not help 
but be conscious of the Soviet Union’s presence on the Korean peninsula as the other 
occupying nation.  On the other hand, an atmosphere of revolutionary fervor reigned over the 
political terrain in post-liberation Korea which rendered ideological classifications irrelevant 
to a large extent, and such organizations as the Committee for the Preparation of Korean 
Independence and local People’s Committees were coalitions between the left and right for 
the most part.  
  
In the process of transmission, however, the Moscow Agreement sparked an 
impassioned debate on trusteeship, and the political terrain in which conservatives and 
radicals had struggled with each other came to be reconfigured ideologically in terms of the 
conflict between democrats and communists.  The fierce dispute over whether or not to 
support the Moscow Agreement, political forces in Korea were pulled asunder and 
reconsolidated into two poles: the rightist bloc called Representative Democratic Council of 
Korea and the leftist bloc called the Democratic People’s Front.  By early 1946, the left-right 
split was the basic topography in domestic Korean politics.  The central contest was no 
longer between national revolutionists and pro-Japanese collaborators as it had been 
perceived by Koreans until then, or between radicals and conservatives as Americans 
preferred to schematize it.  The trusteeship imbroglio of late 1945 and early 1946 had turned 
the left-right opposition into a veritable feud.   
  
As anti-trusteeship movement intensified in Korea, the U.S. military government 
reported its concern to the State Department and requested a copy of the official text of the 
                                                 
12 George Z. Williams was the son of a missionary who founded the Young-myung school at Gong-ju. He 
recommended Cho Byung Ok, a friend of him since childhood, to Gen. Hodge for the head of the police 
department. Cho Byung Ok was the member of the Korean Democratic Party, which was called as a extreme 
right-wing party composed of pro-Japanese landlords and ex-officials of Japanese colonial authorities. The 
party had almost no support from the public, but was armed with plenty of money, and was also a pool of 
human resources needed for the seats inside the American military government in Korea. 
13 24th Corps Staff Journal, “Interview with Lt. Colonel Williams,” 1945. 10. 13. 
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Moscow decision,14 but did not attempt to verify the facts regarding the false report in Tonga 
Daily News and Chosŏn Daily News.  In other words, the military government felt no need to 
rectify the false perception that had led to agitations against the trusteeship.  Hodge’s 
comment that “the antipathy is not primarily aimed at Americans, but we happen to be here 
at hand. Russia comes in for the greater share,”15 reveals in a straightforward fashion the 
American position on the anti-trusteeship movement.  The military government sought to 
manufacture the belief that the Soviets were to blame for trying to impose trusteeship on 
Koreans, and the State Department took a similar line. 
             
At the same time, when in January of 1946 Korean communists changed their 
position on anti-trusteeship and announced their “overall support of the decision reached in 
Moscow,” the U.S. military government saw this as evidence that communists in South 
Korea were Soviet Union’s lackeys.  The critique was not completely groundless since it was 
only after Pak Hŏn Yŏng, the secretary of the Korean Communist Party, returned from 
P’yŏngyang that the position of the South Korean Communist Party changed.  It is more 
probable, however, that this change reflects the general lack of ability on the part of the 
South Korean Communist Party to arrive at an independent understanding of international 
politics.  They may have needed a certain amount of time to understanding the meaning of 
the “decision regarding Korea,” and adapt themselves to the compromise between the U.S. 
and the Soviet Union.  But the U.S. military government did not hesitate to manipulate the 
media in order to spread the view that the South Korean Communist Party’s turnabout proved 
that the Korean left were Soviet puppets.16  
  
The shift in the communist position on trusteeship served as the central occasion for 
reinforcing the U.S. military government’s belief that Korean communists received their 
directives from Russia, but it was the attitude toward the U.S. that served as the basis for 
distinguishing between the left and the right in the conflict which began to be intensified 
during this period.  This was acknowledged in the “History of U.S. Armed Forces in Korea”: 
Richard D. Robinson, who compiled the section on Korean politics, pointed out that in 
addition to a given political group’s activities and experiences during the colonial period and 
afterward, its attitude toward the U.S. military government served as an important factor in 
determining whether the group was to be considered leftist or rightist in the post-liberation 
period.  Before liberation, nationalism and socialism were understood as two sides of the 
struggle for independence.  In this context, the left-right distinction signified a difference in 
the approach to Korean liberation; following the liberation, however, the central question 
became whether one supported American occupation or not.17  The opposition between the 
left and the right in post-liberation Korea, therefore, was not rather an outgrowth of political 
tensions within Korea but than a manifestation of the way in which American Cold War 
policies against the U.S.S.R. became transplanted and actualized in Korea. 
  
                                                 
14 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Vol. VIII,  General of the Army Douglas MacAuthur to the 
Joint Chief of Staff, 1946. 1. 23 
15  24th Corps Staff Journal,  “Corps Staff Conference,” 1945. 12. 31. 
16 A classic example of this manipulation can be seen in the falsified content of the report on the so-called 
“Johnston-Pak Hŏn Yŏng press conference” that broke in mid-January. See CHUNG Yong Wook, op. cit., pp. 
171-176. 
17 “History of U.S. Armed Forces in Korea,” ‘Part II. Korean Politics: The First Year, Chapter II,’ pp. 9-10. 
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Most Koreans during this period also shared the view that the left-right distinction 
was an expression of foreign influence.  Even after separate regimes were established in 
North and South Korea, one nationalist argued, “Now that separate North and South Korean 
regimes have been established, neither peaceful compromise nor military resolutions is 
possible any longer.  What we need is a third way, a purely national action uncorrupted by 
foreign elements.  In other words, foreign influence has shaped the opposition between the 
left and right.  Very few Koreans would try to maintain this opposition to the end.”18    
  
In the aftermath of the trusteeship imbroglio, North Korea also denounced the leaders 
of anti-trusteeship movement as anti-communist and undemocratic fascists, and further 
claimed that they were the henchmen of American imperialism.  One propagandist pamphlet 
produced by North Koreans in the spring of 1946 decried that Kim Koo and Syngman Rhee 
were “traitors to the nation, both historically and practically.  They were born of the marriage 
between traditional feudal and pro-Japanese elements, and they are now the henchmen of 
foreign fascism.”19  In consideration of the contemporary political context, the pamphlet did 
not explicitly name the “fascist imperialist” power, but there is little doubt that the U.S. was 
the country implied.  The labels used by North Korean propaganda such as “anti-communist, 
American henchmen” mirror the approach taken by the anti-trusteeship camp in South Korea.  
Both South Korean attack on communism and North Korean attack on anti-communism thus 
sought to present the leaders of opposing ideology as the henchmen of foreign powers.  To 
put it in a different way, the communist-nationalist clash over the trusteeship debate 
proceeded in a manner that directly reflected the interests of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.  This 
reveals the strong centrifugal force that the two superpowers commanded, and by extension, 
the important role played by international political factors in the formation of anti-
communism in post-liberation Korea.  Neither the standards used to assess the political field 
in pre- and post-liberation Korea, nor the left-right classification arose organically from 
within Korean society and history, but imposed from the outside. 
  
Once the left-right conflict was proposed as the basic paradigm for understanding 
Korean politics, it was imposed violently on Korean society and culture as well.  We have 
already seen how General Hodge defined the objective of American occupation as the 
creation of a bulwark against the Soviet Union.  And when, through the controversy over 
trusteeship in early 1946, the central political opposition in Korea became rewritten in terms 
of the left-right conflict from that between nationalist and collaborator forces in the 
construction of the new state, the U.S. military government was able to simplify the goal of 
American occupation and insert itself into the schema, gaining the power to interpret the 
political field ideologically and to suppress the opponents of the U.S. military government as 
leftists in the process.  Once established by the military government, the equation “left is the 
same as  red” continued to spread outward, becoming more and more encompassing.  From 
spring of 1946 when the military government began to persecute leftists in earnest, all actions 
                                                 
18 Yu Rim, “Keep the Line of Self-Reliance,” Dae-jo, 1948. 12 
19  RG 242  National Archives Collection of Foreign Records Seized, Captured Korean Documents, SA 2013, 
“True Character of Fascist,” 1946, p.12. 
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opposed to the military government was seen as leftist and foreign (the Soviet Union) 
agitations.20  This perspective was applied to mass movements as well.  
  
The U.S. military government began the occupation of South Korea with a sense of 
wariness against the Soviet Union and of crisis regarding the domestic political situation in 
Korea, but managed to polarize the Korean political field into the left and the right over the 
trusteeship controversy.  The left was equated with “Korean Communists” at this time, but 
there was not yet a consciousness that North and South Korean communists could be grasped 
separately: North Korean communists were part of a larger entity called Korean communists, 
and North Korea was simply a territory under their control.  If anything, US military 
government saw the Interim People’s Committee which was established in North Korea in 
February of 1946 as the organizational foundation upon which administrations of North and 
South Korea might be combined, and even reported that the U.S. military government in the 
south and the Interim People’s Committee in the north could be brought together to create an 
administrative entity to oversee the entire peninsula.21  Given the contemporary political 
context and the position of the U.S. military government, it was neither possible nor 
necessary to separate out the North Korean political entity and understand it in distinct terms.     
  
In the context of relations between both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. and North and South 
Korea at the time, the U.S. military government was not in a position to publicly argue the 
puppet theory.  Throughout its occupation, the military government favored white over black 
propaganda, devoting its energy to praising American way of life and American democracy, 
as well as cultivating fantasies about America in Korean minds. Emphasizing the superiority 
of Western liberal democracy, white propaganda presented communism as alternative 
political and ideological system rather than an object to be annihilated.  This was the basic 
tone of the U.S. propaganda before the intensification of the Cold War.  “North Korea” began 
to be grasped as an autonomous political entity only when the possibility of establishing a 
provisional democratic government in Korea through the joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. committee 
faded away, to be replaced by the likely reality of separate regimes in North and South Korea.  
  
Before analyzing the emergence of “North Korea,” we should dwell just a bit on how 
“Korea experts” assessed American policy on Korea in the immediate post-liberation period 
and the U.S. military government’s handling of the occupation.  Owing to the staunch anti-
communism that prevailed in the higher ranks of the U.S. military government, the policies 
the military government pursued were heavily anti-communist throughout the occupation, 
but there were some dissenting opinions.  Liberal officials within the military government, 
for example, took issue with the support the U.S. lent to Korean reactionaries.  Hodge’s name 
for them was “pinkos.”  There were critics outside the military government as well.  In their 
accounts of American policy toward Korea and their histories of the U.S. military 
                                                 
20  “Statement of Outside Influences upon the Recent Unrest and Civil Disturbances in South Korea,” , by 
USAFIK CIC, 1946. 11. 14; “Anti-American and Anti-MG Activities of Democratic People’s Front,” by 
USAFIK CIC, 1947. 6. 20; “Soviet-Communist-Inspired Espionage in South Korea,” Hqs. XXIV Corps, Office 
of the Commanding General, date unknown.  
21  NA II, RG 554 Records of the U.S. Army Field Commands, 1940-1952, Entry 11071, U.S. Army Forces in 
Korea File and Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge Official File, 1944-1948, Box 123, “Tfgcg 305 Gen. Hodge to Gen. 
MacArthur,” 1946. 2. 23. 
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government in Korea, we can glimpse perspectives that deviate considerably from the official 
line.  
  
Among the critics within the American military government were liberal officials 
such as Arthur C. Bunce, Richard Robinson, and Stuart Meacham who tried to push the 
occupation policy in the direction of liberal reform.  Like their superiors in the military 
government and in Washington, these men saw North Korea and leftists in South Korea as 
Soviet lackeys, but felt that the middle-of-the-roaders within South Korea were “genuine 
democrats” through whom specific reform policies must be pursued and mass support of 
Koreans secured.  Richard Robinson, the military historian who contributed the chapter on 
Korean politics in the “History of U.S. Armed Forces in Korea,” later wrote a manuscript 
called “Betrayal of a Nation,” in which he reassessed the history of American occupation in a 
less than favorable light.   
  
Thus we can see that many contemporary “Korea experts” were highly critical of 
policies the U.S. pursued in Korea.  Among these experts were many who began studying 
Korea before liberation.  In varying degrees, articles on Korean situation carried by journals 
like Far Eastern Quarterly, Far Eastern Survey, and Pacific Affairs, observed that the 
extreme rightist tendencies of high ranking individuals in the U.S. military government, 
combined with American support for the far right among Korean politicians, had the overall 
effect of tightening American policy to such a degree that the occupation ultimately resulted 
in a failure.  As can be seen in the comment that “Chiang Kai-shek and Syngman Rhee are 
Francos of the Far East,” denunciation of American policy toward Korea participated in the 
critique of the larger pattern that was emerging at the end of the World War II, namely, 
American support for dictatorial regimes in newly liberated areas around the world.   In short, 
these were liberal critiques of American foreign policy.  The atmosphere of McCarthyism in 
the early 1950s, however, dealt a heavy blow to the liberal position.  As a result, American 
policy toward Korea as well as American perceptions of Korea came to be shaped mostly by 
academics with links to the military and the government, and individuals who had been 
directly involved in post-liberation policymaking and occupation planning in Korea. 
 
 
2. “North Korea” as a Satellite State of USSR, 1948-50 
 
1) Local Background for the Emergence of “North Korea” 
With the establishment of a separate regime in South Korea, Korea policy experts in 
American government and military began to treat North Korea as a separate political and 
economic entity.  Division of Korea took concrete shape through a series of events starting in 
the fall of 1947: the breakdown of US-USSR Joint Commission, the transfer of Korean 
question to the UN, Soviet opposition to the UN transfer and proposal of simultaneous 
withdrawal of both US and USSR troops from the Korean peninsula, the separate election 
held south of the 38th parallel, and finally the establishment of the separate governments of 
the Republic of Korea in the south and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the 
north.  Even though the division of Korea is commonly seen as the result of Truman Doctrine 
applied to the Korean situation, historical and local factors specific to Korea influenced the 
decisions of American policymakers in important ways.  The key event that led the military 
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government to conclude that US political objectives could not be accomplished through the 
Joint Commission was the American delegation’s visit to P’yŏngyang and the meeting 
between General Brown, the head of the delegation, and Cho Man Sik.  
  
While the Joint Commission was in session in 1947, the American delegation visited 
P’yŏngyang in late June and early July for a round of negotiations with North Korean 
political parties and organizations.   The visit was intended to provide US with a grasp on 
North Korean reality.  The delegation put together a schedule of interviews with a range of 
rightist and religious, especially Christian, leaders.  US hoped that the visit would reveal that 
latent opposition to the “Soviet regime” was broad in North Korea, which would serve as the 
basis for attacking Soviet effort to exclude South Korean rightist organizations from being 
consulted in the Joint Commission negotiations.22    
 
To that end, General Brown expressed to the Russians a strong desire to talk to Cho 
Man Sik and was able to arrange a meeting with him on July 1.  A protestant minister, Cho 
Man Sik was a nationalist leader who commanded the largest influence in P’yŏngyang area 
since the colonial times.  Following the liberation, Cho emerged as a central figure in North 
Korean politics, assuming the leadership of Chosŏn Democratic Party which he helped to 
organize.  Chosŏn Democratic Party was a conservative party composed of entrepreneurs, 
landowners and intellectuals, most of whom were Christians.  At first, the Soviet forces 
treated Cho Man Sik with respect and tried to reconstitute the North Korean political field 
around him.  However, when the news of the Moscow Agreement reached Korea in late 1945 
and Cho initiated a fervent anti-trusteeship movement, the Soviet forces placed him under 
house arrest in a hotel, effectively excluding from the North Korean political field from early 
1946 on.  
  
At the American delegation’s meeting with Cho Man Sik, Brown asked the latter’s 
opinion on trusteeship.  Cho’s response was unexpected: even though he believed that the 
ideal scenario would be unilateral US trusteeship, he would accept bilateral US-USSR 
trusteeship if it could not be avoided.  At this talk, Cho expressed strong wish to move to 
South Korea and resume his political activities.23  When Brown asked for Cho’s views on the 
general situation in North and South Korea and specific political leaders in North Korea, Cho 
replied that it was a shame that Kim Koo and Syngman Rhee did not support the American 
delegation for the success of the Joint Commission.  In late May, Cho had already sent a 
secret missive to Hodge to express his concern that Syngman Rhee’s anti-trusteeship 
activities may hinder the Joint Commission’s goals.24  In addition, Cho stressed the point that 
land reform would have to be carried out in South Korea before any election is held or 
interim government established.  
  
                                                 
22 RG 43 Records of International Conferences, Commissions, and Expositions, Records of the American 
Delegation, U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Commission on Korea, and Records Relating to the United Nations Temporary 
Commission of Korea (UNTCOK), M1243, Roll No. 6, “Memorandum for Albert E. Brown,” by Clyde B. 
Sargent, 1947. 7. 2. 
23 M1243, Roll. No. 6, “Memorandum for General Hodge,” by Albert E. Brown, 1947. 7. 2. 
24 M1243, Roll. No. 6, “Memorandum for General Hodge,” by Lee Myo Muk, 1947. 5. 27 
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It is surprising that Cho Man Sik, known until now as a firm opponent to trusteeship, 
expressed his willingness to accept it.  What elicited such a response from Cho was the 
concern that the Joint Commission may fail to reach a compromise, and that the anti-
trusteeship activities of Kim Koo and Syngman Rhee were jeopardizing the success of the 
Joint Commission.  By July of 1947, Cho had changed his position on trusteeship, probably 
realizing that an insistence on anti-trusteeship would inevitably lead to the division of Korea.  
Moreover, the fact that Cho pointed out the necessity of carrying out land reform before the 
execution of trusteeship probably made the American military government look back a 
particular weakness in their rule.  In North Korea, sweeping land reforms had been carried 
out in spring of 1946, a fact that both North and South Korean left-wing circle sought to 
advertise widely to Korean masses.  In South Korea, by contrast, the Korean Interim 
Legislative Assembly was still wrestling over the land reform proposal.  Even as the second 
Joint Commission talks were under way, it was far from clear how land reforms would be 
carried out in South Korea, if at all.   
  
The purpose of American delegation’s interview with Cho Man Sik was to verify that 
political opposition was indeed strong in North Korea; US could then argue for the 
participation of anti-trusteeship organizations in the negotiations and underscore the principle 
of “freedom of expression.”  Cho’s unexpected response frustrated these goals.  Upon the 
delegation’s return from P’yŏngyang, US military government ordered each member of the 
delegation to submit a comprehensive report regarding what they saw and impressions they 
had received.  These reports all pointed out that the People’s Committee was already well 
established in North Korea and that the overall political administration was thorough.25  In 
short, the visit to P’yŏngyang and the meeting with Cho Man Sik, rather than strengthening 
American position in the Joint Commission, had the opposite effect of identifying its 
weaknesses.  Ultimately, the visit caused US to conclude that it would be difficult to 
accomplish American objectives through the Joint Commission.   
  
Once US came to the conclusion that negotiations with USSR through the Joint 
Commission would be impossible, it sought to approach the Korean situation under the aegis 
of the UN.  It was in October of 1947 that the dissolution of Joint Commission was formally 
announced, but as early as August of 1947, US had been making preparations to transfer the 
Korean question to the UN.  The Wedemeyer Mission to Korea in late August played an 
important role in making final adjustments to this policy change.  The discussions General 
Wedemeyer and his staff carried out with the military government authorities in Korea 
clearly reveal how American officials understood the political situation in Korea and what 
they saw as the fitting course of action for the US.   
  
The Wedemeyer Mission was formed in summer of 1947 for the purpose of making 
policy recommendations to the President after investigating political situations in China and 
                                                 
25 M1243, Roll. No. 6, “Pyongyang Trip - American Delegation, June∼July, 1947”. It is generally 
acknowledged that coming into the latter half period of 1947 North Korean economy overcome the fluctuating 
situation and was stabilized. For an example, the currency reform in December 1947 can be cited. The work of 
Pang Sun Joo, “Analysis of North Korean Economy Statistics in 1946,” Asian Culture No. 8, Institute for Asian 
Studies, Hallim University, which analyzed the economic changes happened in North Korea after the Liberation 
through various economic characteristics, could be consulted. 
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Korea firsthand and consulting the opinions of American officials in Asia.26   US foreign 
policy in respect to China was in difficult straits.  As a civil war between the Nationalist 
Party and the Communist Party intensified in China following the end of the Pacific War, the 
US dispatched George Marshall in late December of 1945 to negotiate a compromise 
between the two groups.  Marshall stayed in China for almost a year but failed to achieve 
much success in mediation.  Marshall returned to the States to assume the post of the 
Secretary of State in January 7, 1947, and two days later, US announced that it will cease its 
attempts to mediate peace between the Nationalists and Communists in China.  The 
Nationalist Chinese Forces experienced defeat in the ensuing hostilities and popular support 
for the Nationalist Party dwindled when the Party’s internal corruption and general 
impotence became publicized.  US government and military watched these developments in 
China with great concern.  US military, in particular, maintained that military and economic 
aid to the Nationalist Party must be increased and the US must step in before the situation 
becomes even more exacerbated in China.  The Department of State, on the other hand, 
argued that the Nationalist Party must make reforms prior to any increase in US support.  The 
major newspapers shared the view that aid to Chiang Kai-Shek should not be increased 
before the Nationalist government embarks on a program of reform.27 
  
By July of 1947, the situation in China had come to such a point that the US could no 
longer continue to pursue the policy of non-involvement.  US government carefully weighed 
how much to aid to give and when to get involved, keeping a close eye on both the climate in 
the Congress and trends in media.  The Department of State was exceedingly hesitant to get 
fully involved in the Chinese civil war.  It wanted to achieve, through limited aid, the triple 
goals of stabilization of Chinese politics, reform of the Nationalist Party, and restoration of 
the Nationalist military.  
  
Meanwhile in Korea, the Joint Commission had come to an impasse over the issue of 
which Korean organizations would take part in consultations.  By early July, both the State 
Department and negotiators in Korea deemed it meaningless to continue the talks.  
Consequently, Washington felt the need to consult with the American military government in 
Korea to make practical provisions in the event of Joint Commission’s failure.  The 
Wedemeyer Mission was formed in this context.  During its visit to Korea, the Mission 
assessed American policy for Korea and evaluated the military government’s overall 
performance by conducting extended sessions with officials in the military government.  In 
addition, the Mission examined practical measures that would aid the US in accomplishing 
its objectives in Korea.  The Mission also interviewed Koreans, through which they were 
able to observe how Koreans saw American occupation and responded to the evolution of 
American policy. 
  
By the time Wedemeyer was drafting a report on his investigative activities in Korea, 
the US government had already accepted the breakdown of the Joint Commission and was 
making preparations to involve the UN.  One cannot claim, therefore, that the Wedemeyer 
                                                 
26 Regarding the activities of the Wedemeyer mission in China, William Stueck, The Wedemeyer Mission: 
American Politics and Foreign Policy During the Cold War (The University of Georgia Press, Athens, 1984) 
could be consulted. And the activities in Korea,  CHUNG Yong Wook, op. cit., Chapter 9 could be consulted. 
27 William Stueck, Ibid. pp. 8-9, 18-19. 
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Mission spearheaded the shift in American policy in Korea.  The Mission, however, did play 
an important role at a critical juncture when concrete measures had to be adopted in Korea in 
preparation for the overall policy change.  In his discussions with the military government 
personnel, Wedemeyer stressed the following: the establishment of a separate regime in 
South Korea through a general election, the establishment of a firm anti-communist position 
centered on Syngman Rhee, and active economic and military aid to be rendered to the new 
regime thus established.   
  
In examining these measures agreed upon by the Wedemeyer Mission and the 
American military government in South Korea, we must note not only their content but also 
the perceptions that undergird them.  Hodge shows clearly what the military government 
predicted would happen once the Korea situation was placed under the UN’s jurisdiction. 
 
The left will oppose the election and the UN will establish a separate regime in South 
Korea.  Syngman Rhee and his supporters will take the majority in the National 
Assembly.  The resulting government will be one that not only the Soviets but we ourselves 
would have to call reactionary and fascist, a regime with which it would be very difficult to 
deal, though not impossible.  It will then take a war to reunify North and South Korea.28 
 
On the whole, those who shaped American policy for Korea believed that the UN 
involvement would result in the establishment of separate governments in North and South 
Korea.  They also knew that once this occurs, Koreans would agitate passionately for 
reunification, and that this could bring about a military confrontation.  The Wedemeyer 
Mission’s proposing policy was premised on the prediction that political tensions within 
Korea would eventually lead to military confrontations between North and South Korea.  Not 
only did American officials begin to see North Korea as an autonomous political and military 
entity at this juncture, but they also forecasted from the very start that North-South Korean 
relations would devolve into one requiring a military resolution in the future.  
 
2) The Policy of Containment—Words and Views  
While policymakers relating to Korea were busy preparing for a military 
confrontation that they saw would inevitably result from the UN involvement, foreign policy 
planners and intelligence analysts in Washington D.C. were drafting a justification of 
American policy in Korea.  Overlooking Korea’s local and historical background, the 
justification was couched entirely in the language of containment policy.  A variety of reports 
published by the CIA and the State Department reveal the American logic behind the 
establishment of a separate South Korean government and the words in which this logic was 
rationalized.  
  
We can look, for example, at a report called “Implementation of Soviet Objectives in 
Korea,” prepared by CIA’s Office of Research and Estimate in November of 1947.  The 
paper was based on two initial conclusions: one, USSR will not accept the American 
proposal to establish Korean government by holding an election under the supervision of the 
UN Temporary Commission; two, US insistence on the UN involvement would lead the 
Russians to withdraw their forces unilaterally from North Korea.  The report then analyzed 
                                                 
28  Telegram to George Marshall, the Secretary of State Department, sent by Gen. Hodge, 1947. 11. 21. 
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the impact such withdrawal would have on the Korean political situation and specific 
measures that the US must take in response.  This paper was prepared in coordination with 
the intelligence organizations of the Department of State, Army, Navy and Air Force.29     
  
The paper projected that if the US also withdraws its forces following the Soviet 
withdrawal, North Korea would attempt a North-South “coalition.”  In the event that such 
coalition proves impossible, a military invasion would ensue.  In South Korea, the Syngman 
Rhee group would embark on a dictatorial regime and would not share their power with other 
groups on the right.  As a consequence, the Syngman Rhee group would make all moderates 
join themselves with left-wing circle; since the rightist youth organizations, police force, and 
constabulary in South Korea would not be able to withstand the North Korean attack by 
themselves, the withdrawal of the US forces meant that North Korea effectively would rule 
over the entire peninsula.  The report provides detailed estimations of when and how the 
Soviet Union would withdraw its forces and what constraints such a development would 
place on American action.  Rather than evaluate these projections, it would be useful to focus 
instead on the way the report justifies such an understanding of the Korean political situation.  
All analyses in the report start out from the premise that “Soviet tactics in Korea have clearly 
demonstrated that the USSR is intent on securing all of Korea as a satellite.  In pursuing this 
policy, the USSR has, since V-J Day, adhered to a definite program of infiltration, 
consolidation, and control.”  The paper thus claims that all the events which transpired on the 
Korean peninsula since its liberation from the Japanese colonial rule proceeded according to 
the “Soviet master plan for Korea,” and also claims that the projected withdrawal of the 
Soviet forces is simply an aspect of this plan.  If post-liberation Korean politics is simplified 
as the unfolding of the Soviet “plan,” then North Korea can be acknowledged as an actually 
existing political entity only insofar as it is represented as a Soviet satellite.  All documents 
produced by the US government and military thereafter referred to North Korea as a Soviet 
satellite and the North Korean government as a puppet regime controlled entirely by the 
Russians.  This image became fixed in official foreign policy discourse as well: Soviet Affairs, 
first published in December of 1948 by the Department of State Division of Research for 
Europe, used the term “North Korean puppet regime” in its pages.30     
  
To sum up, then, the urgent foreign policy task for the US government following the 
declaration of the Truman Doctrine was first to formulate the American position and strategy 
objectives vis-à-vis both the USSR and those regions under its influence, and second, to 
develop a logic that would rationalize and further publicize these actions.  The process by 
which the actual political entity called “North Korea” became transformed into a Soviet 
“satellite” in the early Cold War climate of Washington represents an exemplary case of how 
the US materialized its anti-Soviet stance at the global level.  In Korea, the process shifted 
the target of American policy of containment from an internal rival, called “Korean 
communists,” to an external enemy named “North Korea.” 
  
American military government’s anti-revolutionary rule in post-liberation South 
Korea and Washington’s policy of containment in respect to the USSR were converged into 
                                                 
29 CIA, ORE 62 “Implementation of Soviet Objectives in Korea,” 1947. 11. 18. 
30 OIR Report No. 4800.1, Soviet Affairs, December 1948, published by Division of Research for Europe, 
Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State. 
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one in 1947.  From a bottom-up perspective, North Korea was a puppet regime; from a top-
down perspective, North Korea was a satellite of the evil Soviet empire.  The marriage 
between these perceptions produced the particular image of North Korea which 
predominated in the ranks of US government and military from then on.  In the early days of 
the Cold War, there was still a great deal of ambiguity in how US distinguished North and 
South Korea.  Prior to the establishment of separate regimes, the US saw North Korea not as 
a unified political or national entity but as one force among many competing in the struggle 
for power over the Korean peninsula.  Even after the separate regimes were installed, the 
trajectory that the North-South conflict would take was understood in terms of immanent 
factors: the conflict would be kindled by agitations and political unrest within South Korea, 
the North would then infiltrate, and a civil war would ensue.      
  
However, as the concept of containment and the Cold War worldview began to shape 
American foreign policy in East Asia, American perceptions of Korea underwent 
reinterpretation.  American geopolitical interest in the Korean peninsula and Korea’s place 
within the overall American foreign policy for East Asia determined American perceptions of 
North Korea, which in turn unfolded in the context of the importation and consolidation of 
Cold War perspectives.  The pair of equations—the USSR as an evil empire and North Korea 
as a Soviet satellite—congealed into fixed formulas as the US strengthened its aggressive 
stance toward the USSR following the declaration of containment policy.  The ferocious 
wind of McCarthyism was already sweeping across American society, and in Korea, red 
purge was under way across the entire society, through such measures as the National 
Security Law and organizations like the Enlightened Alliance for Coercive Persuasion.  It 
was precisely through the process of perceiving and then representing North Korea as a 
separate entity that the US had effectuated the establishment of separate regimes and the 
policy of division in Korea. 
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3. Theorization and Expansion of the “Puppet Regime” Hypothesis 
 
1) American psychological warfare against North Korea  
 The Korean War broke out on June 25, 1950, and amid the mayhem that 
ensued, demonization of North Korea intensified enormously.  As a terrible war raged 
on, the theory that North Korea a puppet of the evil Soviet empire sprouted and grew.   
 
 
Leaflet  1. A South Korean military leaflet distributed prior to the outbreak 
of the Korean War.  Stalin has two horns while the “red devil” sports a 
single horn.  Stalin’s face is sketched in the manner of “sheep’s head, dog’s 
flesh.” The three Koreans are presented through a dramatic contrast: the red 
devil has his arms raised toward Stalin, in a state of obvious exultation, as 
the North Korean soldier wastes away, while the South Korean soldier 
remains on watch, his eyes bright with alertness. 
 
Psychological warfare had already been going on for some time when the war broke 
out; South Korean had focused on demonizing Korean Workers Party and its leaders as 
Soviet henchmen.  The South Korean leaflet above, for example, depicts North Korean 
communist, possibly Kim Il-sung or Korean Workers’ Party leader—as the devil with a 
single horn.  Stalin has two horns and is Janus-faced, or depicted in the manner of “sheep’s 
head, dog’s flesh”—a Chinese proverb referring to a good-for-nothing with grand exterior.  
The leaflet thus makes use of a classical Chinese proverb to belittle Stalin and Korean 
communists.  For the most part, South Korean wartime leaflets urged North Korean soldiers 
to rebel or withdraw from the army.  Pictures and texts contained in these leaflets either 
attempted political-ideological persuasion or sought to appeal to the individual soldier’s 
desire for personal safety and interest.   The most frequently employed strategy in political-
ideological leaflets was to attack Kim Il-sung as Soviet puppet and Korean Workers’ Party as 
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treacherous and tyrannical.  The leaflet reproduced in Leaflet #1 integrates all of these 
themes.  Noteworthy is the fact that Stalin and Kim Il-sung are depicted not as human beings 
but as horned devils.  The leaflet shows demonization of communists in a remarkably literal 
manner.  North Korean leaflets, on the other hand, rarely depict South Korean leaders or 
Americans as inhuman, preferring instead to present them as repulsive or weirdly distorted.  
The strategy may reflect communists’ worldview that in order to heighten feeling of hostility 
in the viewer, these “traitors to the nation” or “enemies of the people” must preserve their 
essential human aspect.  
  
In their leaflets targeting North Korean and Chinese soldiers and North Korean 
civilians, Americans also used two different approaches: political-ideological propaganda, 
and the appeal to selfish interests of individual soldiers or civilians.  The former category was 
further divided into two groups depending on the message contained in the leaflet.  Leaflets 
were classified according to the names of characters taken from the Shakespearean tragedy of 
Othello as either Iago or Desdemona.31  Operation Desdemona disseminated such messages 
as “The UN forces are fighting for a just cause,” and “The UN forces do not want to harm 
you”.  In contrast, central messages of Iago leaflets were: “Do not trust communists, your 
superiors, and what they say about the war objective,” and “You are being used.”32  If 
Desdemona proclaimed the justified nature of the UN’s involvement, Iago launched political-
ideological attack on North Korea’s war objectives, seeking thereby to foster fragmentation 
within the enemy camp.  Desdemona was white propaganda, Iago black.    
 
Of all leaflets in Korean that American military dropped on the frontlines from 
September 1950 and November 1951, Iago was the largest in number at 28.7%, while 
Desdemona comprised 7.8%.  Of leaflets in Chinese, Iago was also the highest at 28.05% and 
Desdemona represented 11.6 %.  In the rear areas, however, Desdemona outnumbered Iago 
by comprising 34.8% of the total leaflets to Iago’s 28.9%.33       
 
On the frontlines, leaflets containing political propaganda composed only 40% and 
the other 60% sought to appeal to selfish interests of the soldiers.  This was true for leaflets 
in both Korean and Chinese.  The numbers were reversed in the rear areas, with leaflets 
containing political propaganda representing 60% of the total.  Iago leaflets, however, 
comprised approximately 30% of both frontline and rear area leaflets.  We can thus conclude 
that black propaganda was strategy the American military relied on the most in these leaflets.  
As we saw earlier, Operation Iago focused on attacking Communist Party as tyrannical, the 
North Korean regime as Kremlin’s puppet, Kim Il-sung as a fake impostor.  The “puppet 
regime” theory, in particular, reveals in an exemplary fashion the manufacturing of Cold War 
“enemy” on the Korean peninsula.   
 
                                                 
31 ORO-T-21(FEC) “FEC Psychological Warfare Operations: Leaflets,” 1952. 8. 20,  p. 39. 
32  Ibid., p. 92. 
33  Ibid., pp. 96-97. 
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Leaflet 2. Kim Il-sung insists on war even though those around him recommend peace.  
The words “Fake Kim Il-sung” are written on his chest, and his reflection in the mirror 
is faceless.  
 
The below is the text contained in a leaflet on the theme of “fake Kim Il-sung,” a 
recurrent motif in the puppet regime theory.  
 
This man has deceived Korean people in a countless number of ways, but 
the most pernicious of these deceptions has been his usurpation of the 
identity of the great Korean hero, General Kim Il-sung.  He is not Kim Il-
sung at all.  The real Kim Il-sung was born in 1885 and died fifteen years 
ago in Manchuria.  The fake Kim Il-sung, whose real name is Kim Sŏngju 
wasn’t even born until 1910.  He is a communist that the Soviets dispatched 
to Korea in 1945.  By pretending to be Kim Il-sung, this fake poser tried to 
gather the trust of Korean people.  He was successful for a time but the 
truth has finally come to light.  The real Kim Il-sung was a great military 
leader who fought the enemies of Korea.  Kim Sŏngju, on the other hand, 
causes Koreans to kill fellow Koreans.  With his personal greed for power, 
combined with his overall impotence, this man has turned Korea into a 
bleak battlefield.  Is there any doubt that this man is the real enemy of the 
Korean people?34     
 
Let us compare the above with information on Kim Il-sung contained in the “Order of 
Battle Information, North Korean Army,” published on October 15, 1950 by the intelligence 
division of the U.S. Army Far East Command.   
 
                                                 
34  Pang Sun Joo (comp.), Leaflets during the Korean War, (Asian Studies Institute, Hallim University, 2000), p. 
212. 
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Kim Il-sung: Born 1911 in Daedong County, South P’yŏngan Province.  
Child name, Kim Sŏngju.  Joined anti-Japanese guerrilla forces in 
Manchuria in 1930.  For ten years thereafter fought in the guerrilla army led 
by the real Kim Il-sung, under the pseudonym of Kim Yŏnghwan.  The 
highest rank held in the period between 1930 and 1940 was that of the 
secretary in the Communist Party of Northeastern Manchuria.  In 1941, 
when the guerrilla army entered the USSR, the real Kim Il-sung, aged 
somewhere between 55 to 60, died from long-time exposure to hardships.  
The present Kim Il-sung, who was his nephew, adopted the name of Kim 
Il-sung, either on his own volition or following the dying wishes of the real 
Kim Il-sung… Kim entered a Soviet military academy in Havarovsk, and 
obtained the rank of captain in the Soviet military.35        
 
This information is much more detailed than that in the leaflet, and appears for that 
reason to be factual.  In light of recent studies on Kim Il-sung, however, we can now see how 
erroneous and patently false many of its claims are.  The most direct way to prove that Kim 
Il-sung is an impostor is, of course, to establish the identity of the real Kim Il-sung beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  But descriptions of the supposedly real Kim Il-sung found in the above 
two documents are not only contradictory to each other, but groundless as well: the “real Kim 
Il-sung” is a fabricated personage in actuality.  A certain degree of maneuvering might be 
expected in the leaflet—it is, after all, an example of black propaganda—but it is curious that 
the information compiled by the U.S. Army on the highest ranked individual in the North 
Korean Army is based on a specious theory of “fake Kim Il-sung.”  This appears all the more 
strange when we consider that U.S. Army Far East Command had the highest capacity not 
only to collect intelligence but to analyze it.  Since the Command also had at its disposal all 
the information collected by the Japanese military and police over the colonial period, it 
would not have been difficult to verify information regarding Kim Il-sung.  The fact that the 
Far East Command still retained such groundless report in its comprehensive intelligence 
report casts doubt on the reliability of the entire report.  At the same time, it raises the 
possibility that the compilers of the report felt the need to preserve and elaborate the myth of 
Kim Il-sung the impostor.  The report, if it is to be taken at face value, implies that what the 
UN forces risked their lives to fight during the Korean War was a mere puppet and an 
impostor.  
 
                                                 
35 NA II, RG 554 US Army Far East Command, G-2 Theater Intelligence Division, Operation Branch “Order of 
Battle Information, North Korean Army,”1950. 10. 15. “Order of Battle” refers to a survey intended to find out 
the origin and strength of enemy units positioned along the frontline. The titles of the units, number of forces, 
chain of command, units, equipments, the history of both the units and the commanders are all included. 
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Leaflet 3. American leaflet depicting China and Korea as puppets controlled by the 
Soviets. 
 
 The “fake Kim Il-sung” hypothesis, which is also the definitive form taken by  the 
“puppet regime” theory, first made its way into U.S. military documents after the trusteeship 
imbroglio of 1946 when the U.S. military government began to map Korean political terrain 
in terms of elements for and against the trusteeship.36  Recalling the way American and 
British policy documents before liberation described Kim Il-sung as the leader of one of the 
most dynamic forces in Korean independence movement, we can see how fundamentally 
altered American perception of Kim Il-sung became in just a few years.  The change in 
perception owed much to the American military command.   
  
A highly significant aspect of the puppet regime theory is the occasion for its 
emergence.  After the trusteeship debate in late 1945 and early 1946, the U.S. classified 
various political forces in Korea in terms of its own interests; it was in this context that the 
view “communist is the same as Soviet puppet” first emerged.  The same was true in China.  
Only after the communization of China did the U.S. begin to see China as a Soviet puppet.  
As late as the immediate post-WWII period, George Marshall was dispatched to China to 
negotiate a compromise between Nationalist Party and Communist Party.  When the attempt 
failed and the People’s Republic of China was founded in the mainland, the U.S. began to 
proclaim that China is a puppet of the Soviet Union.  The U.S. formally declared China as a 
hostile enemy after the latter’s entry into the Korean War, and in May of 1951, the Secretary 
of State Dean Rusk proclaimed that the People’s Republic of China was “Manchukuo(puppet 
regime) of the Slavs.” Fierce battles were then being fought in what is now the Korean DMZ; 
                                                 
36  “Tfgcg 305 Gen. Hodge to Gen. MacArthur,” 1946. 2. 23. 
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in the international political arena, the U.S. was lobbying the UN to impose economic 
sanctions on China.37 
  
The image of the “enemy” that these leaflets contained was thus anything but naïve 
constructions.  In Korea, the puppet theory was first propounded after the trusteeship 
controversy by that “precocious warrior of the Cold War,” General Hodge.  In relation to 
China, the Secretary of State Dean Rusk voiced the same theory after China became formally 
established as the enemy.  The puppet theory was, first and foremost, a product of the Cold 
War perspective on the world and peoples.  At the same time, it was an integration of 
American interests in Asia as well as America’s policy attitudes toward North Korea and 
China.  Finally, the theory was a projection of perceptions harbored by American leaders.  
Once the image of the puppet was produced, it gained solidity through repeated 
reproductions, and came to function as ideology through systematic theorizations.  Twenty 
years had to pass before the normalization of U.S.-China relations dissipated the view that 
the Chinese were Kremlin’s puppet.  In North Korea’s case, the puppet theory had even 
longer life span; its elimination had to await the collapse of the supposed puppeteer itself, the 
Soviet Union. 
 
2) Perceptions of “North Korea” and methodological considerations 
After the outbreak of the Korean War, the U.S. government and military began to 
examine North Korean society in earnest as a Cold War “enemy.”  The Korean War provided 
the first opportunity for American scholars to come into direct contact with a communist 
society.  The need to better understand the enemy led the U.S. government to mobilize a 
large number of social scientists.   Their research was funded and otherwise aided by 
Operations Research Office of Johns Hopkins University (ORO), Human Resources 
Research Institute of the US Air Force (HRRI), Human Relations Research Office of  George 
Washington University (HumRRO), and the Rand Corporation among others.   
  
In spring of 1951, the U.S. Office of Information Research published North Korea: A 
Case Study of a  Soviet Satellite, the comprehensive American study of North Korea.38  In 
order to compile this study, the State Department sent to Korea an investigative committee 
composed of bureaucrats and academics.  The committee’s attempt to conduct research in 
North Korea was mostly unfruitful due to rapid shifts in the tides of war, but it did succeed in 
performing three months of field work and interviews starting on October 28, 1950.  The 
investigative committee relied on interviews with Koreans residing in P’yŏngyang and other 
areas, information obtained from questioning prisoners of war, North Korean documents 
seized by the U.S. forces, and various documents relating to North Korea in the possession of 
the State Department.  This report analyzed changes in North Korean society from the period 
immediately following the liberation to the outbreak of war by examining a wide range of 
issues.  Even from today’s perspective, the report is rich in the kinds of data from which 
researchers can forge a comprehensive understanding of post-liberation North Korean society.  
The committee, however, approached the material from the premise that North Korea was a 
satellite state and that its regime was transplanted from the outside.  This premise constrained 
                                                 
37  Department of State Bulletin, No. 24, 1951. 5. 28, pp. 846∼848 
38  Office Intelligence and Research, Report No. 5600, “North Korea: A Case Study of a Soviet Satellite,” 1951. 
5. 20. 
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the overall narrative direction and analytic perspective offered in the report.  Subscribing to 
the fake Kim Il-sung hypothesis as well, the report helped to theorize the puppet regime in an 
academically systematic way. 
  
In approaching North Korean society, American social scientists applied wholesale 
the methodology that they used when studying the Soviet society, i.e., Sovietology.  In these 
studies communism was always described as a force that demolishes “order” and “tradition.”  
Communist institutions destroyed stable social structures and subjected citizens to new ones 
of foreign origin.  Underlying such a view was the fundamental assumption that U.S.S.R., 
China and North Korea were totalitarian societies in the manner of Nazi Germany under 
Hitler, pathological societies whose members are beyond ideological enlightenment or 
political persuasion.  They could only be cured of their pathology or converted from their 
fanaticism.39  According to the Cold War perspective of the world, North Korean and 
Chinese leaders were merely puppets of their Soviet suzerain, and individuals in these 
societies could respond only passively and follow the commands of their respective 
communist dictator.  The image of the puppet contained in American leaflets was the logical 
result of such projections of Cold War perspective on the world and peoples. 
  
Nor was it by chance that American military leaflets came to emphasize the desire for 
personal profit.  In conducting psychological warfare, the U.S. military enlisted the expertise 
of social scientists, especially psychologists, communications theorists, and behavioral 
scientists.  The Korean War provided the latter with the first comprehensive opportunity to 
test out their theories of behaviorism in real life.  Groups of behavior scientists were sent to 
the frontlines, ceasefire negotiations, and ceasefire camps in order to come up with models of 
human behavior that could be used to aid the war effort.40  These scholars disagreed with 
psychological warfare staff in the Far East Command.  While the latter argued that political-
ideological content must be the mainspring of the propaganda campaign, behavior scientists 
claimed that it was much more effective on battlefields to appeal to the innate individual 
desire for security and personal profit rather than highlight political tenets or ideology. 
 
                                                 
39  It should be noted that the U.S. officers who were in charge of POW education at the UN forces’ POW camp 
at the Gŏ-jae island considered the rate of conversion to Christianity as a success rate in POW education. 
40  Ron Robin, The Making of the Cold War Enemy (Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 71. 
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Leaflet 4. Political and ideological leaflets aggressively utilized nationalist 
sentiments as well. One interesting detail is that Tangun in this leaflet has 
the physical aspect of a Western man, reminiscent of Zeus or Jesus.  
Considering the head-to-body ratio of all the characters depicted, one can 
surmise that the models were Westerners, perhaps the artist as well.  The 
South Korean soldier and North Korean solder are shaking hands.  The 
slogan at the bottom reads, “Same Ancestor, Same Blood-line, Same 
Nation!”    
 
 This debate explains why leaflets emphasizing personal safety and interest were 
largely produced and also sheds light on the epistemological and methodological framework 
dominant in American studies on North Korea, as well as on prisoners of war and 
psychological warfare.  In large part, American psychological warfare during the Korean 
War was built upon the inheritance of WWII.  Based on their experiences fighting the Nazis, 
behavior scientists believed that a direct attack on ideological symbolism was less effective 
than making a non-ideological appeal.  Rather than denounce Kim Il-sung, they preferred to 
raise questions about his actual existence.  They opposed the claims of men who initially led 
the psychological warfare against North Korea, such as Charles A. Willoughby, the chief of 
intelligence and right-hand man to General MacArthur.  Willoughby espoused clearly 
political themes expressed in strongly ideological language—glorification of democracy and 
assault on communism, for example.  In contrast, behavior scientists argued on the basis that 
psychological warfare is productive only when the enemy is already experiencing confusion 
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or facing impending defeat, that the theme of material benefit should be stressed: physical 
comfort one would enjoy by surrendering, hardships one’s family members were 
experiencing in the rear because of prolonged hostilities, and the promise of physical survival.  
Facing these opposing claims, Robert A. McClure, the then head of the office of 
psychological warfare, resolved the debate by using both kinds of leaflets in the campaign.41             
  
What was the epistemological premise upon which American military could insist on 
similar psychological warfare tactics in both WWII and the Korean War, despite the vast 
difference between the societies and audiences to be targeted?  Operative here was the 
coupled notion of assimilation and discrimination.  Even though the two concepts appear to 
oppose each other, HRRI study on Korean rural society and the State Department’s 
aforementioned study on North Korean society both reveal that these notions were 
simultaneously at work in American perceptions of Korea.   
  
During the Christmas season in 1950, three American scholars visited war-torn Seoul 
and studied the effects of Sovietization in North Korea and in areas that had been occupied 
by North Korean forces.  All three scholars were renowned in their respective fields and 
served as consultants for HRRI.  The head of the committee was Wilbur Schramm, one of the 
superstars in the field of communication studies during the 1950s and 60s, and was 
accompanied by John Riley, the chair of the department of sociology at Rutgers University 
and an important figure in the field of behavioral science, and John Pelzel, an assistant 
professor of anthropology at Harvard University and a polyglot fluent in East Asian 
languages.  Twenty-five South Korean social scientists accompanied them during their 
fieldwork, and provided translation, guidance, political analysis, etc.  Based on the findings 
of this investigative mission, the three men compiled a massive report called A Preliminary 
Study of the Impact of Communism upon Korea.42               
  
In the work, John Pelzel offered a peculiar analysis of sociopolitical processes in 
Kŭmnam District near Taejŏn.  According to Pelzel, the political fragmentation of the village 
in question and the widespread sense of discontentment among the villagers had to be traced 
back, not to concrete ideological and economic issues affecting their lives, but to traditional 
village customs, in particular, bad-blood between descendants of primary wives and 
descendants of secondary wives.  Pelzel identified the inferior status given to children of 
secondary wives as the main cause of conflicts in Korean traditional society.  He argued that 
the structure of Korean social stratification and not economic class was what divided 
Koreans.  According to his generalization, the friction endemic to traditional Korean social 
structure was reorganized by opportunistic communist intruders.  Descendants of primary 
wives became political conservatives and descendants of secondary wives were classified as 
progressives.  Ideological and economic differences were not considered problematic, and 
only the obsession with the long-held tradition defined the fissures in Korean society.  For 
Pelzel, problems of underdeveloped societies were to be located in tradition and confined to 
                                                 
41  Ibid., pp. 102-104. 
42  A Preliminary Study of the Impact of Communism upon Korea, Psychological Warfare Research Report No. 
1, Human Resources Research Institute, Air University, US Air Force, May 1951. 
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psychological conflicts between individuals, but economic struggle or ideology remained 
essentially foreign to them.43             
  
The starting point for HRRI report was the denial of any relevance of economic class 
and ideology in understanding internal fissures of Korean society.  Historical and social-
structural factors such as the efforts of Koreans to overcome the colonial legacy following 
the end of WWII and the frustrations of these efforts, the attachment to land by Korean 
peasants under the Japanese colonial rule, indeed the legacy of the colonial rule itself were 
excluded from analysis, and the gap left open by this omission was filled with a specious 
hypothesis about the roots of disputes in traditional society.  By positing communism as the 
catalyst that brought out these tensions on to the public arena, the report attempted to ascribe 
the grave effects of Cold War politics on Korea to scuffles between individuals based on 
traditions of Korean rural society.  The historical context that led to the unfolding of 
revolutionary situations in post-liberation Korea, or particular characteristics of these 
situations were not considered important.  Revolutionary fervor was merely an outcome of 
Sovietization, and Sovietization was a global trend that the U.S. had already witnessed in 
Eastern Europe and various other parts of the world.44 
  
HRRI report clearly shows the dominant way in which American social scientists 
apprehended the nature of the Korean War as well as North and South Korean societies at 
large.  The social fissures that became visible as the war advanced were not explained in 
terms of Koreans’ historical experience in the modern period, or Korean political and 
economic structures, but misread as conflicts between individuals carried over from 
traditional society.  What kindled such conflicts into full-scale conflagrations was 
communism, an ideology imported from outside.  Subscribing to contemporary theories in 
behavioral science, HRRI report surmised that personal time in conflict with historical time 
had a much greater influence than social, economic, and cultural variables on the Korean 
response to communism.  Understood this way, the Korean War became a conflict that could 
arise between individuals in any society governed by tradition on the one hand, and a fight 
between puppets carrying out the commands of a foreign ideology.   By excluding historical 
context from Korean society, behavioral science theory thus translated the experiences of 
people in a distant country into simple vocabulary readily understandable by the American 
public.   
  
If behavioral science theory addressed to Americans functioned to make a war raging in 
a newly liberated country on the other side of the globe explainable in a familiar language, it 
functioned vis-à-vis Koreans as an aggressive methodology to justify American perceptions.  
It sought to assimilate Koreans at the epistemological level by imposing American ways of 
understanding and seeing the world.  Concomitantly, however, American social scientists 
performed Sovietology, a way of breaking up a given society into the mutually exclusive 
categories of “friend” and “foe.”  In this regard, Sovietology was a discriminatory act that 
retroactively posited irreconcilable difference between entities based on whether they are 
placed inside or outside the system of containment that the US had delineated.  Even though 
                                                 
43  Dr. John Pelzel, with Special Reports by Major C. N. Weems, USAFR, “The Sovietization of Two South 
Korean Rural Communities,” A Preliminary Study of the Impact of Communism upon Korea, pp. 140-141. 
44 Ron Robin, op. cit., pp. 78-79.  
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North and South Korea was historically considered a single entity bound by territory and 
historical experience, American social scientists applied different explanatory models to 
North and South Korea following the outbreak of the Korean War.  South Korea, placed on 
hither side of the line of containment was understood in terms of modernization theory.  
North Korea, on the thither side of the same line, was submitted to Sovietology.  The 
methodological difference suggests that the question of American geopolitical interest, rather 
than Korean social structures and history, constituted the primary basis for studies of North 
and South Korea in the United States.      
 
 
4. Conclusion  
The Korean War was a strange war indeed.  Politically and militarily, all the 
superpowers involved—the U.S., USSR, China—tried to limit the war proper to the Korean 
peninsula.  One of the schisms between Truman and MacArthur that ultimately led to the 
latter’s dismissal from his post was the disagreement over whether the military action should 
be spread to Manchuria and mainland China. Chinese soldiers were dispatched not as the 
official deployment of People’s Republic of China but under the guise of Chinese People’s 
Volunteers.  The USSR also tried to evade official involvement in the Korea War, even 
though they supplied munitions to both Chinese and North Korean forces and sent war planes 
and pilots.  In this regard, the Korean War was limited politically and militarily but unlimited 
ideologically and psychologically.  Both sides, in fact, devoted their energies primarily to 
psychological warfare once the frontline became more or less stabilized near the present-day 
DMZ in the summer of 1951.  When it became clear that neither side could militarily bring 
the other to its knees, both combat and negotiations, indeed all measures that affected the war, 
began to be interpreted psychologically and propagated accordingly.  All the cases such as 
the disagreement over the principle of exchanging prisoners of war, the controversial claims 
made by the Chinese and North Koreans that the US conducted germ warfare, and the 
mistreatment of prisoners of war by both sides had been utilized from the psychological 
warfare perspective.  From 1951 on, propaganda was more important than battlefield action, 
and “war of words” came to take up the combat itself.  
  
Even more curious is the observation that Korea is conspicuously absent in the 
Korean War, despite the fact that the Korean people were its greatest victims.  We can 
examine the case of North Korea first.  After separate governments were established in North 
and South Korea, the US identified North Korea as a Soviet satellite, and North Korean 
leaders as Soviet puppets.  Following the outbreak of the War, the US proclaimed that North 
Korea was a “Cold War enemy” and announced once again that it was a Soviet and Chinese 
puppet.  These images were publicized not only to Americans and South Koreans but to the 
world at large.  As a satellite and a puppet, North Korea disappeared from view as the actual 
subject of action in the War. 
  
How about South Korea?  In the Korean War Memorial in the Washington D.C. Mall, 
there are stones on which casualty figures from the War are engraved; one of them is read 
“Wounded U.S.A. 103,284, UN 1,064,453”.  Reading this figures, I thought at first that a 
mistake had been made.  Because U.S. soldiers comprised the majority of the UN forces, it 
didn’t make sense that they would represent only a small fraction of the total UN casualties.  
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Soon I realized that it was my thinking, not the numbers, that was in error.  The casualty 
figure for the UN soldiers included the South Korean soldiers who made up the bulk of the 
casualties.  I came to a sharp realization at that moment that South Korean soldiers in the 
Korean War were acknowledged only as a part of the UN forces.  The Korean War, despite 
its name, was a UN War in which South Koreans could not represent themselves.  It is no 
surprise, then, that South Korea could not participate as one of the signatories of the ceasefire 
agreement.  
 
 In the Korean War, North Korea could exist only as a puppet and South Korea only as 
a member of UN.  Through the period of US military occupation which brought Korea from 
the euphoria of liberation to ravages of war, Korean agency was eliminated.  Only “North 
Korea” and “South Korea” as redefined according to American interests came to remain.  If 
Orientalism refers to an age-old intellectual tradition in the West that defines the East as “that 
something which is not in the East,” one might say that the Korean situation represented yet 
another opportunity for manifestation of Orientalism.  And situated at the very heart of such 
perceptions were American Cold War strategies and East Asia policy.  
  
Even though Korea was non-existent in the Korean War, the war left behind indelible 
scars and an enduring legacy that continues to pose difficult problems for Koreans.  In 
American society, the spread of McCarthyism at the popular level had much to do with 
propaganda and politics of fear deployed by McCarthyists, but the mass media played an 
even more important role.  Films such as The Manchurian Candidate show how images of 
the USSR and Asian communist nations like China and North Korea were formed and 
nurtured in popular culture.  The media played a key role in the spread of anti-communism in 
South Korea as well, but unlike the States, anti-communism became deeply engraved in 
Korean people’s psyche through such violence as the war, massacres, and punishments of 
compulsory laborers.  Through the experience of the Korean War, anti-communism came to 
take on indestructible power in Korean society.  Red complex became a basic survival 
instinct that dominated individual psyches even after the end of the Korean War.  A long 
time had to be passed for desire for peace and reunification to neutralize mutual hostilities 
between North and South Korea.  The hostilities, however, persist in a corner of Korean 
society as knots that remain to be untangled.   
  
